Current Account ‘Core-Periphery Dualism’ in the EMU. CEPS Working Document No. 406/March 2015 by Cesaroni, Tatiana & De Santis, Roberta
  
Current Account  
‘Core-Periphery Dualism’ in the EMU 
Tatiana Cesaroni and Roberta De Santis 
No. 406 / March 2015 
Abstract  
Current account (CA) dispersion within European Union (EU) member states has been 
increasing since the 1990s. Interestingly, the persistent deficits in many peripheral countries 
have not been accompanied by a significant growth process that is able to stimulate a long-run 
rebalancing, as neoclassical theory predicts. To shed light on the issue this paper investigates 
the determinants of eurozone CA imbalances, focusing on the role played by financial 
integration. The analysis considers two samples of 22 OECD and 15 EU countries; three time 
horizons corresponding to various steps in European integration; different control variables; 
and several panel econometric methods. The results suggest that within the OECD and EU 
groups, financial integration helped to explain CA deterioration in the peripheral countries, 
especially in the post-EMU period. The business cycle seems to have played a growing role 
over time, whereas the role of competiveness seems to have diminished. 
 
JEL Classifications: F36, F43  
Keywords: current account imbalances, financial integration, EMU, core-periphery countries, 
panel econometric models. 
 
 
CEPS Working Documents are intended to give an indication of work being conducted 
within CEPS’ research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the 
field. The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the official position of CEPS. 
 
 
ISBN 978-94-6138-446-1 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) 
© CEPS 2015  
  
 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................................1 
2. Stylised facts .............................................................................................................................4 
3. Data description and sample selection ...................................................................................6 
4. Econometric analysis ................................................................................................................9 
4.1 Full sample analysis ..................................................................................................... 11 
4.2 Robustness with respect to time horizon, EU groups and financial openness 
measures ........................................................................................................................ 13 
4.3 Robustness to control variables: the role of institutions ............................................ 16 
5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 16 
References ....................................................................................................................................... 18 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................................ 20 
Figure 1. CA balance in industrialised economies ...................................................................... 20 
Figure 2. CA balance in the EMU core and periphery countries ................................................. 20 
Figure 3. CA balance in Italy, Germany and the other core and periphery countries................... 21 
Figure 4. CA balance (average) in the EMU countries ............................................................... 21 
Figure 5. Chinn Ito index of capital openness in the EMU countries. Period 1986-2012 ............ 22 
Source: authors elaborations on Chinn-Ito (2008) ...................................................................... 22 
Figure 6. De facto capital openness index in the EMU countries. Period 1986-2012 .................. 22 
Source: authors elaborations on EWNII Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2012) ................................... 22 
Figure 7. Contributions to CA balances (1999-2007)* ............................................................... 23 
Table 1. Data description ........................................................................................................... 24 
Table 2. Summary statistics. Sample 1986-2012 ........................................................................ 25 
Table 3 CA determinants in OECD and EU countries. Full sample 1986-2012. ........................ 26 
Table 4. CA determinants in OECD and EU countries. FE model. Sample 1999-2012............... 27 
Table 5. CA determinants in the EU countries over time. Fixed effects model. ........................... 28 
Table 6. CA elasticity to main explanatory variables in the EU countries* ................................. 29 
Table 7. CA imbalances and “governance” in the EU countries. Sample 2000-2012. ................. 30 
 
 
  1 
Current Account ‘Core-Periphery Dualism’ 
in the EMU 
Tatiana Cesaroni and Roberta De Santis* 
CEPS Working Document No. 406 / March 2015 
1. Introduction  
While the current account (CA) of the eurozone as a whole has remained almost balanced since 
the 1990s, dispersion across member states’ CAs has been increasing. Diverging trends among 
countries have become particularly evident in the post-EMU period and have been 
characterised by persistent CA deficits in the eurozone periphery that have been 
complemented by growing surpluses in some core countries. Such heterogeneous behaviour 
has been called ‘eurozone CA core-periphery dualism’ and represents a shortcoming for both 
the long-run sustainability of peripheral EU member states’ finances and the effectiveness of 
centralised intervention within the euro area. 
The lack of a spontaneous rebalancing process1 among euro area economies has stimulated a 
wide debate within the European institutions about the absence of proper rules and 
parameters, such as ceilings for single countries’ CA imbalances within the existing EU 
treaties. The need to implement a stricter degree of policy coordination among eurozone 
members to prevent such imbalances from expanding in the future has also been emphasised, 
and the adoption of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) within the EMU 
countries at the end of 2011 goes very much in this direction.  
According to the neo-classical theory of intertemporal utility maximisation, diverging CA 
among countries is the natural consequence of a future convergence of economies with 
different levels of capital endowment. Specifically, countries with lower income per capita and 
higher productivity growth would be expected to attract foreign investment, in view of the 
higher expected rates of return on capital. The productivity of the invested capital would 
eventually produce CA rebalancing through competitiveness gains in tradable sectors and the 
reimbursement of external debt.  
                                                   
* Tatiana Cesaroni is an economist at the Bank of Italy; Roberta De Santis is an economist in 
Econometric Studies and Forecasts, at the Italian Institute of Statistics. 
The authors would like to thank Luigi Cannari, Sergio De Nardis, Marco Ventura, Paolo Savona, 
Giuseppe Ferrero and two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions. The authors 
also thank participants at the XXVI Villa Mondragone International Economic Seminar, Bank of Italy 
and Istat seminars, CFE-ERCIM 2014 conference, PISA and the INFER-LAREFI workshop on “Financial 
Globalization, International Trade and Development”, Bordeaux for valuable comments and advice. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
institutions with which they are affiliated. Any errors remain the authors’ sole responsibility. 
1 In the post-crisis period (2009-12), there was a substantial adjustment in the external imbalances of the 
euro area peripheral countries. However, this rebalancing was mainly due to the decline in domestic 
demand and the contraction in private investment, particularly in construction, as result of the economic 
crisis, and thus cannot be associated with a good rebalancing process.  
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Nevertheless, from the beginning of the EMU to the present there has been no clear evidence 
of a spontaneous CA rebalancing process within the EMU, despite a strong adjustment in the 
external imbalances of the eurozone peripheral countries during the financial crisis.  
Various explanations have been proposed in the literature for the persistence of CA deficits 
among EU periphery members, including, for example, a lack of competitiveness due to high 
unit labour costs or unproductive investment in non-tradable sectors (i.e. housing investment). 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) offered another interesting explanation immediately after the 
creation of the EMU. By analysing the causes of eurozone imbalances the authors showed that 
national saving and investment correlations in the periphery decreased significantly, 
especially as European financial integration intensified (i.e. with the creation of the single 
currency). They considered this evidence to be an indication of the EMU suitability to create a 
well-integrated capital market (i.e. ‘home bias reduction’). They also found that the 1980 
Feldstein and Horioka, puzzle (i.e. the absence of capital outflows from higher income per 
capita countries to poorer countries with higher expected returns) did not hold in the 
eurozone, interpreting this fact as an increase of financial integration and a natural cause of 
CA divergences among EMU countries2 that reflected opportunities to catch up and for future 
convergence in the periphery.3 Ten years later the stylised facts have shown that the persistent 
deficits in many peripheral countries have not been accompanied by a significant growth 
process able to stimulate a long-run rebalancing, as neoclassical theory predicts. 
In this paper we explore the causes of the persistent CA divergences among eurozone 
countries (i.e. CA ‘core-periphery dualism’) during the EMU, focusing on the role of the 
European financial integration process. To this end we examine the impact of capital flows 
liberalisation (in addition to the main CA determinants) within the eurozone, using different 
time samples, groups of countries and econometric techniques and control variables. 
Robustness checks are also performed by taking into account the role of financial integration 
using two different indicators: the Chinn and Ito (2008) index of capital openness (known as 
the de iure measure) and a financial diffusion indicator that considers the ratio of financial 
assets plus liabilities to GDP for each country compared with the rest of the world (a de facto 
measure); both are available for a broad set of countries. Although these two capital openness 
indices are very different (they capture different aspects of financial development), they allow 
for complementary sources of information on the phenomenon of financial integration to be 
explored. Since Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), a large body of literature has investigated the 
determinants of CA balances for different sets of countries using various regressors (income 
per capita, exchange rates, trade openness, Net Foreign Assets, budget balances, GDP growth, 
population growth, interest rates, oil price, dependency ratios, financial development 
measures and institutional factors). 4  However, to the best of our knowledge, no paper 
                                                   
2 This enables easier access to international capital markets of some “peripheral” countries and would 
therefore have helped to generate domestic demand pressures that finally led to the accumulation of 
large and persistent current account deficits.  
3 See Cesaroni et al. (2009) for a description of the main properties of the Euro Area business cycle and 
stylised facts. 
4 Income per capita, exchange rates, trade openness, Net Foreign Assets, budget balances, GDP growth, 
population growth, interest rates, oil price, and dependency ratios are the standard classical 
determinants of CA used in the literature. However, some of them have become less significant in 
explaining the more recent patterns of CA imbalances in both developing and industrialised countries. 
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systematically analyses the CA core and periphery effects of financial integration and capital 
openness in the eurozone countries.  
Among the papers linking CA imbalances to financial integration indicators in the world 
economy Chen and Prasad (2003) analyse the medium-run CA determinants but focus mainly 
on developing countries (18 developed and 72 developing countries), using cross-section and 
panel techniques for the sample 1971-95. They find evidence of a positive impact of financial 
deepening (approximated by an M2/GDP measure) on CA for the whole sample that is even 
stronger for the subset of developing countries.  
Chinn and Ito (2008) extend the work of Chen and Prasad (2003) and analyse the determinants 
of CA imbalances, focusing on the role of financial development and institutions. They focus 
on a set of 19 industrial and 70 developing countries over the period 1971-2004 but do not 
control for European countries’ specificities. To measure financial development they use the 
private credit/GDP ratio and find evidence of a negative and significant effect of this indicator 
on CA for both industrialised and emerging groups. In the augmented regressions 
(considering institutions and financial integration effects) they also use the Chinn and Ito 
(2008) index of financial openness to account for financial development, and find evidence of 
a negative effect on CA only for industrialised countries. They conclude that financial 
development as a solution for the global saving glut is not supported by empirical analysis. 
As robustness checks, the authors use three alternative measures of financial development 
(first principal components of private credit to GDP, stock market capitalisation, private and 
public bond market capitalisation, and so on), which for the most part confirm the previous 
results. 
Among the papers focusing strictly on the euro area, Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) 
consider a panel of 49 advanced (including 27 EU) and emerging economies in 1973‒2008. 
They find that financial openness (approximated by a financial liberalisation index and the 
Chinn and Ito, 2008 index) lowers CA in aggregate, but they do not consider the financial 
integration effects separately for core and periphery groups. 
Schmitz and von Hagen (2012) distinguish between balances against the eurozone and the rest 
of the world and examine these flows for the EU-15 countries, approximating financial 
deepening with income per capita data. In their main finding eurozone members’ net flows 
followed differences in income per capita, even before the introduction of the euro. Their 
econometric investigation also reveals quite a substantial financial deepening of European 
capital markets, whereby divergent capital endowments across the EMU countries triggered 
by financial integration are found to flow from countries where capital was abundant to 
countries in which it was scarce.  
Belke and Dreger (2013) compare the relative effect of income per capita differences and 
competitiveness on CA using panel co-integration techniques for 11 euro area countries and 
different sub-sample periods and conclude that diverging competitiveness (approximated 
with the real exchange rate) has been the main factor in external imbalances in the eurozone. 
To account for differences in peripheral countries’ behaviour they run separate regressions for 
Greece, Spain and Portugal and find evidence of a decreasing role of income per capita (used 
as proxy for catching up) for these countries over time. They conclude that an asymmetric 
policy response is required to reduce the imbalances (i.e. a depreciation of real exchange rates 
in the deficit countries by cutting unit labour costs) but in the analysis do not consider financial 
integration among the explanatory variables. 
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Finally, Sanchez and Varoudakis (2013) assess the contribution of some macroeconomic factors 
associated with CA imbalances in the eurozone by estimating a panel-data vector 
autoregressive model for the period 1975–2011, without considering the impact of financial 
integration. In their findings demand shocks contributed more to CA balance dynamics in the 
eurozone periphery than in the core, whereas competitiveness (measured by real exchange 
rates or unit labour costs) was a less prominent factor in the periphery but more important 
than in the core. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it provides a broad 
empirical analysis of the determinants of intra-eurozone CA balances, including some 
European financial integration process indicators, using static and dynamic panel data 
techniques.5 To this end we assess the relative contribution of the regressors to CA dynamics 
through an impact analysis. Second, it explicitly takes into account the different behaviour of 
core and periphery countries in relation to some selected regressors, using interaction effects 
in the regressions. Finally, in order to study the role of governance and institutional quality in 
determining the imbalances within the EMU we expand the set of regressors to include 
qualitative variables.  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 reports the main stylised facts concerning current 
account imbalances within the EMU, section 3 describes data sources and sample selection, 
and section 4 describes the empirical strategy, estimated results and robustness checks. 
Conclusions follow. 
2. Stylised facts 
There is strong evidence that CA balances have been progressively diverging among member 
countries since the beginning of the 1990s.6 While in a small group of countries (mainly Spain, 
Greece, Portugal, Italy and Ireland) deficits became large and persistent, another group of 
countries (chiefly Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and Austria) registered large 
surpluses. This finding reflects what in the recent literature has been called “European core-
periphery dualism of current accounts”. After the recent eurozone debt crisis, concerns 
emerged over the suitability of common fiscal and monetary policies to reduce countries’ 
divergences. The question whether core-periphery dualism existed before or was actually 
fostered by the intensification of European economic and financial integration process has also 
been a central point in this debate.7 To shed light on the question it is important to analyse 
carefully the determinants of the disequilibria.  
In order to analyse these dynamics, Figure 1 reports the current account balance for the euro 
area, the US and Japan for the period 1991-2012. Looking at the overall dynamics, we see that 
while Japan and the US were persistently in surplus and deficit (respectively), the eurozone 
experienced a balance close to zero with a trend towards a small surplus after the 2008 crisis 
(see Figure 1, in the Appendix).  
                                                   
5 While the static panel approach has been widely used in this context, very few papers concentrate on 
dynamic panels. 
6 European Commission (2012). 
7 Caporale et al. (2014). 
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To disentangle the dynamics of CA within the eurozone members, Figure 2 reports the trends 
of current account averages for core and peripheral countries. The core countries are Germany, 
Austria, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, while the periphery group is 
composed of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece.  
Observing the dynamics of intra-area CA balances it is evident that while in the pre-euro 
period there was no substantial divergence on average between core and peripheral countries, 
from 2000, when the EMU was completed, the divergences and the dispersion of current 
account positions in the member countries become evident. Although this trend can be 
considered part of a more global phenomenon among the advanced economies due to capital 
liberalisation, it was particularly pronounced within the European Union (see Figure 2, in the 
Appendix). 
In the period 1985-2008 Germany and a number of other smaller northern European countries 
(core countries) progressively built up larger current account surpluses than in some 
peripheral countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland).8 International investors purchased 
above all financial instruments issued by France and Germany that were then used as capital 
inflows within the euro area to finance demand components in deficit countries.9 
More specifically, the intra-euro-area capital flows either financed government debt (in 
Greece), financial sector borrowing such as real estate (in Spain and Ireland), or a combination 
of both (in Portugal and Italy). This pattern of capital flows suggests, among other things, that 
eurozone investors viewed securities issued by peripheral European countries as close 
substitutes for securities issued by the core countries more than investors from outside the 
euro area. 
Among the periphery and core groups, Italy and Germany displayed particular dynamics. 
Germany’s current account surplus performed best among the core countries, while the 
deterioration in Italy’s current account was not as severe as for the other peripheral countries. 
In order to take these differences into account, Figure 3, in the Appendix, reports the dynamics 
of Italy’s and Germany’s CA together with the CA averages of the remaining core and 
periphery countries. 
Looking at Figure 3 we note that although many recent economic analyses include Italy among 
the peripheral countries, its situation is quite singular and differs from that of both core and 
peripheral countries. 
Italy’s current account balance deteriorated steadily from 1996 to mid-2011. From a surplus of 
3.2% of GDP in 1996, the CA balance turned slightly negative in 2002-05 and deteriorated 
significantly after the 2008 financial crisis, reaching a deficit of more than 3% of GDP in 2010-
11.10  
                                                   
8  Portugal’s deficit remained at the very high levels reached early in the decade. See European 
Commission (2012). 
9 Germany was a net supplier for the euro area and a net receiver from outside the euro area (Ibid.). 
10 As documented in Cesaroni (2008), whereas during the 1980s output fluctuations in Italy were driven 
mainly by a firm’s catching-up process, during the 1990s demand-side factors (i.e. currency shocks) 
became more significant. 
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Part of the decline in the current account balance was driven by worsening terms of trade as 
the increasing price of imported oil – on which the Italian economy is structurally dependent 
– negatively affected the goods balance. Since the adoption of the euro Italy's net international 
investment position (NIIP) has also deteriorated: it stood at -8.3% of GDP at the end of 1996, 
but declined to about -22.5% by the end of 2012. However, unlike the other peripheral 
countries, the accumulation of current account deficits since 2006 is only partly explained by 
the deterioration in Italy’s NIIP.11  
Figure 4 (see Appendix) reports the average current account of all the core and periphery 
countries for the two sub-periods 1986-98 and 1999-2012. 
From the graph we see that the average CA balance switched from positive to negative for 
Italy, France and Ireland and from negative to positive for Austria and Finland. In 2009-12, 
there was a substantial adjustment in the euro-area peripheral countries’ external imbalances. 
On average the CA balances of Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal improved and Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and Italy eventually reached surpluses. The rebalancing of trade (and thus 
of CA balances) in the peripheral countries was mainly due to domestic demand declining 
faster than output. Moreover, the dispersion of CA balances in the EMU also remained high 
in the aftermath of the crisis and the rebalancing was mainly caused by a business cycle 
deterioration rather than a catching-up effect. 
3. Data description and sample selection 
We consider two different groups of countries: a full sample containing 22 emerging and 
industrialised OECD members 12  and a sub-sample of 15 EU countries, both of which include 
the 11 main EMU13 economies. Although our analysis focuses on the eurozone, the comparison 
with the full sample allows us to check the robustness results for the subset of EU countries, 
have a wider set of remaining countries of the group to use as control, and to compare our 
findings with those obtained in other empirical studies using a broader set of countries.  
To account for core-periphery effects in the estimates we split the EMU countries into two 
different groups: core (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland and France) and 
periphery (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) according to the prevailing definition in 
the literature.14 The data come from different sources: OECD, Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2012) 
and World Bank databases (see Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix for a detailed description of 
the data sources and summary statistics). The time sample spans from 1986 to 2012. 1986 is the 
                                                   
11 See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti databank, EWN II (2012). 
12 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and 
the US. 
13 1999 marks the beginning of the euro period for all countries except Greece, which joined in 2001. 
Given the small size of their economies compared with the euro area as a whole, the omission of later 
entrants (namely Slovenia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) should not significantly affect the results. 
A similar choice was made by Caporale and Girardi (2011), among others. 
14 We also performed some sensitivity analysis, but changing the position of Italy from periphery to core 
does not change the empirical result. 
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year in which the Single Act15 was signed and 2012 is the latest available year for most of the 
series in the dataset.  
To explain CA determinants we selected a group of regressors on the basis of their economic 
importance and statistical significance. We divide the explanatory variables of CA into four 
groups: i) macroeconomic fundamentals;16 ii) time and country dummies; iii) capital openness 
measures; and iv) governance indicators.  
The first group includes: 
i) Real effective exchange rate (REEX).17 This variable takes account of price level differences 
between trading partners. In particular, it considers variations in relative prices using 
consumer prices indices with base 2005. Movements in real effective exchange rates 
provide an indication of the evolution of a country’s aggregate external price 
competitiveness.18 An increase in the index indicates a real effective appreciation and a 
corresponding deterioration in the competitive country position (hence a worsening of the 
CA balance). It is expected to have a negative sign in the regression.  
ii) Fiscal balance ratio to GDP. The reason for using this is the potential effect of the fiscal 
balance (calculated as tax revenue and the proceeds of assets sold, minus any government 
spending) on the current account (positive or negative). Higher levels of public saving 
across countries historically tend to be associated with larger current account surpluses 
(theory of twin deficit).19 We do not have any a priori on the sign. 
                                                   
15 A core element of the Single European Act signed in 1986 was to create a single market within the 
European Community by 1992.The most novel aspect of the Single Market Programme (SMP) was its 
focus on capital mobility. Some EU members had unilaterally liberalised capital mobility prior to the 
SMP, but substantial pan-European liberalisation came only in the second half of the 1980s with a series 
of single market programme directives. The opening was completed in 1988 by a directive that ruled 
out all remaining restrictions on capital movements among EU residents. The definitive system was 
codified in the Maastricht Treaty. 
16 We also tried different specifications using more classical regressors such as dependency ratios or 
interest rates. The fitting was lower than the specification chosen. 
17 The role of real exchange rates in determining current account positions is a basic element of the 
theoretical framework of both traditional and modern approaches to international macroeconomics. For 
a discussion on the empirical application see Chen et al. (2012), J.B. Gossé and F. Serranito (2014), A. 
Belke  and C. Dreger (2013). 
18 Percentage changes in the index are calculated by comparing the change in the consumer price index 
for a given country, converted into US dollars at market exchange rates, to a weighted average of 
changes in its competitors’ indices. Chain-linked index takes as base period 2005 (source OECD). 
19 See Chinn (2005). This hypothesis underlines the fact that, according to the national accounts, the 
current account balance (EXP-IMP) is equal to saving (S= Sp+Sg) minus investment. Therefore, any 
expansion of the fiscal deficit (G-T) that lowers public saving (Sg), the other variables being equal, 
should cause a worsening of the current account balance. (Sp+SG)-I=(G-T)+(EXP-IMP). In the more 
sophisticated version of the hypothesis, which takes into account the endogeneity of private saving and 
investment decisions, fiscal expansion boosts domestic spending, pushing up domestic interest rates 
relative to foreign rates; this attracts foreign investors and buoys the national currency, thereby 
widening the current account deficit. 
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iii) Business cycle. A positive business cycle (measured as output gap)20 will produce a higher 
income, leading to an increase in consumption expenditure, including imported goods and 
services, and lowering the CA. This variable should also catch the impact of the financial 
crises and is expected to have a negative sign in the regression. 
iv) Income per capita. Higher levels of income reflect higher productivity due to larger capital 
endowments. This variable has been used extensively in the past as a proxy of productivity 
and competitiveness (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). It is expected to have a positive sign 
in the regression. 
v) Real oil price in US dollars. This indicator accounts for the influence of the oil price on the 
current account balance. 
The second group includes:  
i) Dummies for steps to deepen European economic integration, such as the Single European 
Act, ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of EMU. We do not have any 
a priori on the signs. 
ii) Dummies for different countries’ subsets such as OECD, EU, core-periphery groups. We 
do not have any a priori on the signs. 
The third group includes indicators of financial openness. Financial openness indices capture 
the degree of financial market liberalisation and development affecting cross-country capital 
flows. Looking at the financial account as the difference between saving and investment and 
considering the link between current account and financial account, the expected sign of 
financial integration on the current account balance will depend on the prevailing 
transmission mechanism to these two components. More specifically, the greater is financial 
development, the higher will be the expected returns on investment projects (and the lower 
the associated risk). The effect of financial development on saving is controversial due to 
possible substitution effects; more developed financial markets and a more sophisticated 
financial system would, according to one point of view, lead to greater saving. From another 
point of view they would reduce the need for precautionary saving and could decrease the 
saving rate. Thus, considering net saving, if the magnitude of the financial development effect 
on saving exceeds that on investment, we will have an improvement in the CA; if the effect on 
investment is greater than the effect on saving, we will have deterioration in the CA. 
Specifically, we use the following two indicators in the analysis: 
i) The Chinn-Ito index of capitals movement restrictions (finopen).21 Higher values of this 
index indicate greater financial openness as the country is more open to cross-border 
capital transactions. The expected sign on the current account balance depends on the 
prevailing transmission mechanism (Chinn and Ito, 2008). 
                                                   
20 The output gap estimate comes from the OECD database and it is calculated using a production 
function approach. As showed in Cesaroni (2010) the OECD production function approach is very 
similar to other statistical output gap estimates based on detrending methods and filters. 
21 The index is the first principal component of the binary variables pertaining to cross-border financial 
transactions based on the IMF’s categorical enumeration taken from the Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
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ii) Financial openness index (finopen1). The index is given by the sum of financial assets plus 
liabilities divided by GDP and it represents a de facto measure of financial diffusion in a 
given country. We do not have an a priori on the CA balance effect of this indicator as the 
expected sign depends on the prevailing transmission mechanism described above (see 
Figures 5 and 6 in the Appendix). 
The fourth group includes governance indicators taken from two different sources: the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database (see Kaufmann et al., 2010) and the 
Economic Freedom of the World database produced by the Fraser Institute.22 These indicators, 
coming from opinion surveys, are qualitative and are used as control variables for a check of 
robustness results. The indicators used are Voice and Accountability, Corruption Reduction, 
Government Effectiveness, Capital Market Regulation, Capital Control and Regulatory 
Quality. All the indicators, with the exception of corruption, capital controls and credit market 
regulations (available from 2000 on an annual basis) are only available from 2002 onwards. 
We expect all these indicators to have a positive impact on the CA balance as they all proxy 
‘institutional quality’. The improvement in institutional quality is a drag on moral hazard and 
adverse selection and leads to more effective capital allocation in the international financial 
market (see Table 1 of the Appendix for a full description). 
4. Econometric analysis  
In this section we empirically investigate to what extent European financial integration and 
other EU specific effects (i.e. the creation of EMU) accounted for CA divergences among the 
Eurozone members using both static and dynamic panel econometric models. 
Static panel data approach  
As we have cross-country time series data and in order to compare the results with previous 
studies based on pooled regressions, we first consider static panel regressions. We estimate 
the following equation: 
ܥܣ௜௧ = ߚ௜ + ߚଵ ∗ ܴܧܧ ௜ܺ௧ିଵ + ߚଶ ∗ ܾܿݕ௜௧ + ߚଷ ∗ ܫ(݇)݂݅݊݋݌݁݊௜௧ + ߚସ ∗ ܫ(݇)݂݅ݏܾ݈ܽ௜௧ + ߚହ ∗ ܼ௜௧ [1] 
where the dependent variable CAit is the CA balance to GDP ratio in nominal US$ determined 
by the difference between Exports and Imports plus Net Income and unilateral transfers.23 The 
country and year indices are respectively i and t and ߚ௜ collects the fixed country effects. REEX 
is the real effective exchange rate of the currency included with a time lag to avoid possible 
endogeneity; bcy it is a proxy of the business cycle (output gap); fisbalit is the public budget 
                                                   
22  The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarising views on the 
quality of governance of a large number of enterprises, citizens and expert respondents in industrial 
and developing countries. The data are gathered from several survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organisations, international organisations, and private sector firms. The Fraser Institute 
measures and studies the impact of competitive markets and government interventions on individuals 
and society. See Economic Freedom of the World database (2013).  
23 We decided to take as dependent variable the overall CA balance and not the intra-area CA balance 
because the evidence showed a strict correspondence between the CA deficit and surplus within the 
area that could potentially lead to some statistical misspecification once the regression was run for the 
EU sample. 
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balance divided by GDP; and finopenit is the financial openness indicator (i.e. a de facto capital 
openness indicator and the Chinn-Ito index). Zit contains common factors affecting the CA and 
includes indicators of real oil prices, income per capita, internal distance, geographical area 
and governance.24 Finally, I(k) is a binary indicator accounting for interaction effects among 
groups of countries that takes the value one (and zero otherwise) for (a) countries belonging 
to core (k = 1), (b) countries belonging to periphery (k = 2), and (c) countries belonging to the 
OECD but not to the core or periphery (k = 3). This interaction is considered for both capital 
openness and budget balance data. Regarding the decision to split the budget balance effects 
as well as the capital openness effects on the CA, it is important to stress that while the impact 
of the fiscal stance is not our main focus, it might be relevant to explore the link between the 
sign and magnitude of budget balance and capital openness coefficients in the regressions.  
Dynamic panel data approach 
A dynamic panel is used in the analysis because trade flows, and thus the CA, are affected by 
marked persistence effects due to the existence of sunk costs in entering foreign markets. 
However, considering dynamics raises econometric problems. If trade were a static process, 
the fixed-effect estimator would be consistent for a finite time dimension T and an infinite 
number of countries N. But since we consider CA evolution a dynamic process, the 
transformation needed to eliminate the fixed effects produces a correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the transformed error term that renders the least square estimator 
biased and not consistent. To avoid the inconsistency problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
suggested transforming the model into first differences and running it with the Hansen two-
step GMM estimator. 25  Arellano and Bover (1995) described how additional moment 
conditions could increase efficiency if the original equations in levels were added to the system 
of first-differenced equations. This estimator, the ‘System GMM’ estimator, has been refined 
by Blundell and Bond (1998). The estimated dynamic equation takes the following form: 
ܥܣ௜௧ = ߚ௜ + ߚ଴ܥܣ௜௧ିଵ + ߚଵ ∗ ܴܧܧ ௜ܺ௧ିଵ + ߚଶ ∗ ܾܿݕ௜௧ + ߚଷ ∗ ܫ(݇)݂݅݊݋݌݁݊௜௧ + ߚସ ∗ ܫ(݇)݂݅ݏܾ݈ܽ௜௧ + ߚହ ∗ ܼ௜௧ [2] 
Although the System GMM provides many advantages, we should also consider some caveats. 
First of all, the approach is complicated to implement and can easily generate invalid 
estimates. To cope with the complexity, the key is to obtain proper instruments, to guarantee 
the overall validity of the moment conditions, and to control for serial correlation in the error 
term of the equation in levels. In the analysis we employ the Hansen test to check for the 
overall validity of the selected moment conditions and we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
test to check for possible serial correlation in the level equation. In addition, there is a specific 
issue associated with our exercise when using the System GMM. The long time-dimension of 
our dataset (1986–2012) may cause too many instruments,26 which potentially makes the two-
                                                   
24 The internal distance of a country (taken from the Cepii database) is approximated by the area of the 
country or its square root multiplied by a suitably defined proportionality factor. The area is the 
geographical area of the country in km2. We decide to introduce these two variables in the estimate as 
proxies of market potential to control for the dimension of the national markets in line with the relevant 
literature. See, for example, Melitz (2005). 
25 They show how the two key properties of the first differencing transformation – eliminating the time-
invariant individual effects while not introducing disturbances for periods earlier than period t-1 into 
the transformed error term – can be obtained using any alternative transformation (i.e. forward 
orthogonal deviations). 
26 In the regressions we selected from 2 to 4 instruments depending on the regressions. 
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step System GMM not appropriate for inference. To deal with this issue, in what follows we 
use the one step System GMM, although theoretically less efficient than the two-step 
counterpart. However, according to Bun and Windmeijer (2010), the difference between both 
is only marginal. In the GMM we used the lagged variables of the corresponding endogenous 
variables as instruments. 
4.1 Full sample analysis  
Table 3 reports the estimate results of static fixed effects and dynamic panel regression models 
for the OECD and the EU country groups in the full sample 1986-2012. To evaluate the possible 
impact of time-invariant factors such as area and internal distance, we also compare the Fixed 
Effects results with the Hausman and Taylor (HT) estimator.  
To determine the static econometric strategy (i.e. Random Effects versus Fixed Effects) we 
performed a Hausman specification test to check the presence of correlation between 
explanatory variables and individual effects. Results show that the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation is refused, indicating that for our purposes the Fixed Effects model provides more 
efficient estimates than the Random Effects one.27  
In addition to the main macroeconomic determinants an EMU dummy28 taking into account 
the effect of the EMU countries joining the common currency on the CA is also included in the 
estimates. For the OECD group, we checked for possible different effects of financial 
integration and fiscal stance in the ‘core and periphery’ eurozone countries by including in the 
estimates three complementary interaction terms for the financial integration indicator 
(finopen*core, finopen*periphery and finopen*OECD_EZ) and three for the fiscal balance 
(fiscalbal*core and fiscalbal*periphery and fiscalbal*OECD_EZ29), all built by multiplying the 
core, periphery and OECD_EZ dummies for the above indicators. Core, periphery and 
OECD_EZ dummies take into account the effect of financial openness and fiscal balance on 
the CA respectively for the core, periphery and OECD countries excluding the eurozone. 
Finopen is the Chinn ITO (2008) index taken in levels. For the EU subgroup (14 countries) the 
interaction effects terms obviously refer only to Core and Periphery. 
OECD countries. The estimate results for 22 OECD countries obtained with the fixed effects 
model (column 1) show that the REEX, output gap, income per capita and oil price are 
                                                   
27 The two most widely used panel data models are the random effect model (REM) and the fixed effect 
model (FEM): both can control for heterogeneity. Their assumptions are different. REM models require 
unobserved bilateral effects to be ~ n.i.i. and orthogonal to the remaining part of the error term. 
Regressors have to be uncorrelated to individual effects and error term for all cross-sections and time 
periods. If the orthogonality conditions hold, the REM provides more efficient estimates than FE 
estimators. If explanatory variables are correlated with unobserved individual effects FEM is consistent. 
28 This dummy considers the different entry dates of the various countries in the EMU. 
29  Following the literature (Caporale and Girardi, 2011; Caporale et al., 2014) we define Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands as “core” and Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain as peripheral EMU countries. 
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significant and enter with the expected signs.30  The EMU dummy is also significant and 
contributes to lower the CA in the period considered. 
Looking at the interaction terms, the most interesting finding is that the financial openness 
indicator seems to have had a positive impact on the CA imbalance for the OECD countries 
excluding the eurozone on average (2.39), whereas disentangling the impact for EMU core and 
periphery countries it emerges that financial integration had a negative impact on the 
periphery (-1.22) but for the core countries the coefficient is positive though not statistically 
significant. Our evidence of a positive impact of financial openness (measured with the Chinn 
and Ito index) for the OECD group excluding the eurozone is not fully comparable with the 
results of Chinn and Ito (2008). They find a negative and significant relationship with the CA 
for developed countries and a positive relation for less developed and emerging economies. 
When comparing the results we have to consider that our subsample associated with the 
interaction term OECD non-EZ is very small (11 countries) and is a mix that includes both 
industrialised economies such as the US, Canada, Japan, the UK and Switzerland and 
emerging countries such as Korea and Mexico.  
Another interesting result concerns the relation between the CA and the fiscal balance for the 
three interaction terms. According to our estimates the fiscal balance has a positive and 
significant sign for the eurozone core countries (0.26) and for the OECD group excluding the 
eurozone (0.21), confirming the twin deficit hypothesis for these groups of countries, in line 
with the findings of Chinn and Ito (2008). 31  Interestingly, the panel estimates show no 
significant relation between the government and the external balance for the peripheral 
countries. However, it is worth noting that this outcome is the average of very different 
individual country results and structural changes could somehow have had an influence. To 
further investigate this apparently counter-intuitive result for the periphery, we considered 
additional regressions, testing the differentiated impact on the current account of the budget 
balance regressor interacted with the three dummy groups (core, periphery and OECD). In 
this case we found that the budget balance is positive and significant as aggregate, but 
regressing the budget balance on the CA considering interaction terms, we find even in this 
case a negative and not statistically significant coefficient in the periphery. As a further check 
we also considered specifications including the cyclically adjusted budget balance. The results 
of a not significant effect for the periphery group are confirmed. 
Comparing the results with respect to other panel techniques we find that for the HT estimator 
(column 2) the previous findings are confirmed, whereas the variables internal area and 
distance, introduced to account for possible geographical country (time invariant) effects, are 
not statistically significant. The estimation results from the dynamic panel model are reported 
in column 3. For income per capita and oil price the sign and the size of the estimated 
coefficients are similar to those obtained with the FE model. For business cycle and REEX the 
magnitude of the coefficients slightly decreases to -0.21 and -0.04 respectively. The effects on 
the CA coming from core and periphery groups concerning the interaction terms both for fiscal 
                                                   
30 In this form it is not possible to make a cross comparison of the magnitude of the coefficients that are 
not elasticities as the regressors are not in logarithmic form. This is due to the fact that many indicators 
take negative values and cannot be transformed into logarithms. 
31 We also tested the cyclically adjusted budget balance indicators and the results were substantially 
unchanged. 
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balance and financial openness are also confirmed, showing similarity and robustness with 
respect to the static panel estimates. 
European Union countries. The fixed effects estimates for the EU sample (column 4) show robust 
and similar results with respect to the OECD sample although with a different magnitude of 
impact coefficients. Specifically, the output gap coefficient is significant (-0.28) and seems to 
indicate that the business cycle contributed to explain CA trends, even with a lower impact 
with respect to the OECD sample (-0.36). By contrast, the real effective exchange rate (-0.16) 
seems to have had a greater role in explaining CA dynamics within the subset of EU countries. 
The financial openness coefficient for the core countries is positive but not statistically 
significant, whereas for the periphery it is negative and significant. Looking at the interaction 
terms for budget balance we find a positive and significant coefficient for the core countries 
(0.23). Moreover, the panel estimates show no significant relation between the government 
and the external balance for the peripheral countries (in this case the coefficient is negative but 
insignificant). 
Overall, financial openness seems to have had a negative and significant impact only on the 
peripheral countries (financial openness for the core countries is not significant) both in the 
OECD and EU subsets. In the OECD group the EMU dummy coefficient, in line with the 
findings of Schmitz and von Hagen (2012), is negative and significant indicating a negative 
effect of the EMU. The results also hold for the EU group. The negative sign of the EMU 
dummy therefore seems to be consistent with the negative impact of financial integration for 
peripheral countries in both the OECD and EU samples and suggests, similarly to Jaumotte 
and Sodsriwiboon (2010), a role of capital flows in determining CA imbalances in the 
periphery. The disentangled impact of the fiscal balance for core and peripheral countries on 
the CA shows in this case too that the twin deficit hypothesis is confirmed only for the core 
countries, while for the peripheral countries the regressor is negative but not statistically 
significant.32 See Table 1, in the Appendix. 
4.2 Robustness with respect to time horizon, EU groups and financial 
openness measures 
In order to check the robustness of the results of EU countries in the full sample (1986-2012), 
in Table 2 we replicate the same fixed effects regression procedure in a shorter sample (1999-
2012) corresponding to the post-EMU period. As a further check, given the peculiar behaviour 
of CA balance dynamics in Germany and Italy with respect to other core and peripheral 
countries, we also consider an EU subset sample that excludes Italy and Germany from the 
estimates (column 3). It is worth noting that when considering the post-EMU period the capital 
account openness measures can lose significance in interpretation depending on the way in 
which they are constructed. For example, the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito 
appears to have lower variability in this shorter sample because since the creation of the EMU 
the index has been nearly constant at the level of highest capital openness within the eurozone 
countries. To deal with this shortcoming, in the following set of regressions we use a de facto 
financial integration indicator (finopen1) built as the sum of net assets and net liabilities 
divided by GDP in place of the Chinn and Ito index. As for REEX, the indicator is included 
                                                   
32 Belke and Dreger (2013) a find a negative coefficient of fiscal deficit in three periphery countries in a 
similar time sample, although their fiscal indicator is the level of government debt and not the deficit. 
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with a lag in the estimates in order to avoid possible endogeneity (here due to the fact that the 
numerator of the ratio comes from the balance of payments financial account component). As 
we show in this paragraph, the use of this second financial integration indicator does not 
weaken the previous findings because it also performs very well in the full sample (i.e. from 
1986), providing similar results and conclusions. See Table2, in the Appendix. 
Looking at Table 2 all the previous results are confirmed, especially for what concerns the 
impact of financial integration on core and peripheral eurozone countries. The sensitivity 
analysis in column 3 also shows that the exclusion of Germany and Italy from the sample keeps 
the empirical results substantially unchanged.  
To check the reliability and the stability of our findings for the EU subset after the introduction 
of EMU, in what follows we concentrate on the group of EU countries and we assess the 
estimate results with respect to different time samples. These also allow us to make some 
considerations on the role played by the European integration process in determining CA 
disequilibria. To this end, Table 3 compares the coefficients of the regressions over three 
samples corresponding to various European integration deepening steps: i) the full sample 
1986-2012 with 1986 corresponding to the ratification of the European Single Act; ii) the 
economic integration sample 1993-2012 with 1993 as starting date, being the year of both the 
completion of the Single Market Programme and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty; and 
iii) the post-EMU sample 1999-2012. See Table 3, in the Appendix. 
Looking at the changes in the coefficients’ magnitude over the three periods there are some 
interesting findings: i) the REEX coefficient decreases substantially in the post-euro period33 
showing, similarly to Sanchez and Varoudakis (2013), a minor role for competitiveness in 
explaining CA trends in the last decade; ii) the business cycle has a greater role in explaining 
the CA balance in the post-euro period than in the other two previous samples; and iii) the 
magnitude of the financial openness coefficient for the periphery countries almost doubled in 
the post-euro period in line with the stylized facts (paragraph 2, Figure 2). Interestingly, the 
financial deepening indicator coefficient for the core countries is positive and significant 
starting from 1999. This result corroborates the view of Schmitz and von Hagen (2012) that the 
dispersion of CA balances in the eurozone widened after the introduction of the euro and thus 
that somehow during the process of financial integration it partly failed to fulfil the predictions 
of the OCA theories. 34  Income per capita, which in the literature is used as a proxy of 
convergence and catching up, is positive and statistically significant and its magnitude 
increases over time. This finding could suggest a convergence between the EU groups. 
However, as a robustness check we redid the same regressions disentangling the overall effect 
of income per capita for core and periphery using interaction dummies (as we did for financial 
openness and budget balance). The results, which we do not report for reasons of brevity, 
suggest a completely opposite interpretation: in this case income per capita is in fact positive 
and significant only for the core, whereas for the periphery group the coefficient is negative. 
This result is in line with the findings of Belke and Draeger (2013). 
                                                   
33 The REEX is not statistically significant in the post-EMU period at aggregate level, while it is 
statistically significant for the periphery group. 
34 These results are also in line with Caporale et al. (2014). 
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In order to give an idea of the absolute magnitude of the impact of the coefficients on the CA, 
in Table 4 the average elasticity of the estimated coefficients over the 3 periods is reported.35  
Looking at the results we note that the business cycle elasticity significantly increases in the 
EMU period from -0.05 to -0.72. By contrast, the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate 
seems to decrease over the sub-samples analysed, suggesting a decreasing role for price 
competitiveness. The elasticity of the fiscal balance for the core countries increases in the post-
EMU sample. Interestingly, the average elasticity of the financial openness coefficient for the 
peripheral countries shows a progressive increase from about -0.4% before the EMU to -1.5% 
in the post-EMU period for the peripheral countries. For the core countries the elasticity of 
financial openness in the post-EMU period is about 1.8%. These results support our hypothesis 
of a role played by European integration process in determining the core-periphery dualism 
in the EMU. The absence of an endogenously determined process of current account and 
business cycle convergence within the eurozone, as seems to emerge in the empirical analysis, 
suggests that to guarantee financial stability within the eurozone more coordinated policies 
and a stricter European surveillance procedure might be needed.36 
Impact analysis. To further analyse the impact of financial openness on the CA, in what follows 
we assess the contribution of core and periphery countries’ explanatory variables to the model 
prediction. More specifically, we evaluate the contribution of the various regressors to overall 
CA variation between 1999 and 2007 (2008 is the year of the crisis). The sum of the contribution 
is equal to the model’s predicted value. We also report the actual and predicted values of CA 
growth rates over the period for each country. To perform the impact exercise we consider the 
regression coefficients reported in column 3 (post-EMU sample) of Table 5.  
The results of the impact analysis suggest that the main contribution to the CA growth rate 
between 2007 and 1999 came from income per capita, which contributed to an increase in the 
CA for all countries. In interpreting this result we have to keep in mind that income per capita 
is averaged over the full set of countries. As we saw before, a disentangled estimate of income 
per capita in the periphery produces a negative coefficient and thus would produce a negative 
contribution in the period. Figure 7 also shows that the budget balance contributes to an 
increase in the CA in the core countries (especially Germany and Austria). 
The main contribution of financial openness to reducing the CA among the peripheral 
countries is in Ireland; a result that highlights the Irish financial system’s heavy exposure, even 
before the 2007 housing bubble burst (the large capital flows in this country are also linked to 
the advantageous fiscal system that attracts foreign direct investment). Competitiveness 
contributes to lower the number of CA in all the countries except Germany. As expected, the 
business cycle contributes to the deterioration in the CA in almost countries (except Portugal). 
The oil price also plays, as expected, an important contribution in lowering the CA for all 
countries. Income per capita makes an important contribution to explaining the CA in all 
                                                   
35 Elasticity is the percentage variation of the CA as a ratio to GDP due to a unitary percentage variation 
in the explicative variables included in the estimates. The elasticity reported in the table is given by the 
estimated coefficient times the average regressor value for the period under examination, divided by 
the average value of the dependent variable.  
36 It should be underlined, however, that in the aftermath of the crisis some reforms have already been 
implemented. For example, a new surveillance and enforcement mechanism was set up in December 
2011 as part of the so-called ‘Six-Pack’ legislation, which reinforced economic governance in the EU and 
the euro area.  
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countries, although, as explained when describing the estimation results of Table 5, the 
coefficient comes from an average of core and periphery effects. Disentangling the effect for 
core and periphery (introducing the interaction term in the estimates), we would find the 
opposite contribution to the CA in the periphery. 
4.3 Robustness to control variables: the role of institutions 
The dispersion of the CA balances in various eurozone members, especially after 1999, 
reported in the literature has also been considered in relation to qualitative indicators 
approximating governance and policy coordination (Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010; 
Eichengreen 2010). To make some further robustness checks, in Table 5 we include some 
governance indicators in the previous estimates. Although the governance concept is widely 
discussed among policy-makers and difficult to quantify in empirical analyses, especially if 
the aim is to assess the effects of European governance, we try to approximate it through 
institutional quality indicators at country level. In interpreting the latter analysis, however, we 
need to take into account all the caveats due to the use of signals coming from qualitative 
survey indicators. As these indicators are only available without discontinuities starting from 
1999, the estimation sample is 1999-2012. 
The estimation results reported in Table 5, column 1 show that the corruption indicator that 
accounts, by construction, for an increased reduction of corruption, is statistically significant 
and indicates, as expected and in line with Eichengreen (2010), that the decrease in corruption 
improves the CA balance within the EU countries. The results (Table 7, column 2) also show 
that the effectiveness of governance (which reflects perceptions of the quality of public and 
civil services and the degree of governance independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies) is statistically significant and contributed to the improvement in 
the CA balance during the EMU. The voice and accountability indicator is also statistically 
significant during the EMU and enters with the expected positive sign. See Table 5, in the 
Appendix. 
By contrast, capital control (limits on financial flows), regulatory quality and credit market 
regulation are not statistically significant in the period considered. This could be because the 
phenomenon is captured by the quantitative financial openness indicator included in the 
estimates. Overall, the governance indicators seem to have played a role in explaining CA 
dynamics during the EMU.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we analysed the role of financial integration in determining the dispersion in CA 
balances among eurozone members. More specifically, we quantified this impact through the 
introduction of two financial integration indicators in the estimates, namely the Chinn and Ito 
(2008) index and a de facto measure of capital openness. According to our estimates, and mostly 
in line with the prevailing theoretical and empirical literature, financial integration seems to 
have played a role in explaining CA dynamics in both the main OECD and the EU countries. 
In particular, looking at the eurozone and differentiating the impact of financial integration 
for core and peripheral countries, we find evidence of a negative impact of financial 
integration in the eurozone periphery. Moreover, this negative relationship seems to have 
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increased in the post-euro period. The business cycle has also played a growing role over time, 
whereas competiveness appears to have reduced its impact on CA balances.  
The increase in foreign capital inflows in the peripheral countries indicates that the EMU was 
effective in integrating the European capital market. However, the home-bias reduction in the 
financial market contributed, according to our estimates, to creating a ‘CA core-periphery 
dualism’, especially in the post-EMU period.  
This finding suggests that the recent reforms of European governance designed to create 
stricter European surveillance procedures, by reducing asymmetric CA imbalances in the 
Eurozone, could improve the effectiveness of centralised policies.   
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1. CA balance in industrialised economies 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. CA balance in the EMU core and periphery countries 
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Figure 3. CA balance in Italy, Germany and the other core and periphery countries 
 
* The core average excludes Germany and the core-periphery excludes Italy. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CA balance (average) in the EMU countries 
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Figure 5. Chinn Ito index of capital openness in the EMU countries. Period 1986-2012 
 
Source: authors elaborations on Chinn-Ito (2008) 
 
Figure 6. De facto capital openness index in the EMU countries. Period 1986-2012 
 
Source: authors elaborations on EWNII Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2012) 
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Figure 7. Contributions to CA balances (1999-2007)* 
 
*Fixed effects set to zero. 
Source OECD data. 
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Table 1. Data description  
Current account Sum of net exports of goods, services, net income 
and net current transfers as a percentage of GDP. 
All in nominal terms (US $). 
Source: OECD 
(1986-2012) 
Output gap 
 
% deviation of GDP from its trend. Source: OECD 
Fiscal balance/GDP Tax revenue minus any government spending. Source: WDI 
World Bank 
Income per capita 
 
Income per capita in US dollars. Source: OECD 
Real effective exchange 
rate 
Percentage changes in the index are calculated by 
comparing the change in the consumer price index 
for a given country converted into US dollars at 
market exchange rates to a weighted average of 
changes in its competitors’ indices, Chain-linked 
index takes as base period 2005. 
 
Source: OECD 
Real oil price in US$ Price of oil in US dollars. Source: Thomson 
Reuters 
Corruption  Is the abuse of public power for private gain. Source:Fraser 
Institute 
Capital controls Restrictions on the citizens’ ability to own foreign 
currency, bank accounts domestically and overseas. 
Source:Fraser 
Institute 
Regulatory quality Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development.  
 
Source:WGI 
World Bank 
Voice and accountability Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media.  
 
Source:WGI 
World Bank 
Government effectiveness Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies.  
 
 
Source:WGI 
World Bank 
Private sector credit Measures the extent to which government 
borrowing displaces private borrowing. 
 
Source:Fraser 
Institute 
Credit market regulation 
 
Measures the restriction under which banks 
operate. 
Source:Fraser 
Institute 
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Chinn-Ito index Capital openness measure. Source: Chinn-Ito 
(2008) 
Finopen 1 Net foreign assets+ liabilities (NFA+NFL)/GDP. Source:EWNII 
Lane and Milesi 
Ferretti (2012) 
Internal distance The internal distance taken of a country is 
approximated by the area of the country or its 
square root, multiplied by a suitably defined 
proportionality factor.  
Source: Cepii 
Area The area is the geographical area of the country in 
Km2. 
Source: Cepii 
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics. Sample 1986-2012  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
cagdp 579 1.066625 5.528006 -15.3773 25.10396 
bcycl 567 0.035219 2.799673 -12.6077 10.73026 
reex 594 99.81061 12.17988 63.7 146.2 
finopen 562 1.81517 1.022902 -1.86397 2.439009 
oil price 594 67.15765 45.84463 24.8901 168.745 
finopen1 572 3.656724 4.642344 0.25269 37.56802 
incomepc 594 21.58691 8.874802 4.467985 58.25797 
fiscalbal 542 -2.21286 4.746157 -30.62 18.79 
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Table 3 CA determinants in OECD and EU countries. Full sample 1986-2012. 
 OECD EU 
 F-E H-T GMM-SYS  F-E H-T GMM-SYS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cait -1  
 
 0.72***   0.87*** 
constant 6.90*** 11.40** 0.97 -13.82 *** 19.25** -0.023 *** 
 
fisbali*OECD_EZ 0.21*** 0.22 ***     
fisbal*core 0.26** 0.26*** 0.09 0.23** 0.23** 0.04 
fisbal*periphery 0.07 0.07 -0.11** 0.01 0.03 -0.15*** 
bcycle.it -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.21*** -0.28*** -0.28 *** -0.13*** 
REEXit-1 -0.12 *** -0.12*** -0.04*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.02 
finopeni*OECD_EZ 2.39*** 
 
2.24*** 0.27    
finopen*core 0.16 0.27 0.08 -0.23 0.04 -0.12 
 
finopeni*periphery -1.22*** -1.23*** -0.60*** -1.03 *** -1.12*** -0.40** 
EMU -1.36 *** -1.38 *** -0.40 -1.93 *** -1.97*** -0.33 
Oil price -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03 *** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 
income per capita 0.34*** 0.30 *** 0.27 *** 0.35*** 0.32 *** 0.20 *** 
distance  -0.02 0.00  -0.1 -0.1 
area  
 
 0.00 0.00  0.00 000 
Number of 
countries 
21 21 21 14 14 14 
Observations 513 513 513 317 317 317 
ܴଶ 0.27   0.45 
 
  
Sargan over-
identifying 
restriction test 
  254.27 
(0.000) 
 
 
 212.05 
(0.000) 
Test for interaction 
terms (F or  
1.09 
33.20*** 
1.03 
32.3*** 
0.37 
6.43** 
3.11* 
19.43*** 
4.8** 
8.3** 
2.73* 
Over-identification 
test  (S-H ) 
 4.04 
(0.85) 
 7.66 9.44* 
(0.26) 
 
*** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. P-value in parenthesis  
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Table 4. CA determinants in OECD and EU countries. FE model. Sample 1999-2012 
 OECD EU EU ex Italy and Germany 
constant         -0.33 -0.82 -0.83 
fisbali*OECD_EZ 0.23***   
fisbal*core 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.91*** 
 
fisbal*periphery 0.01 0.02 0.03 
bcycle.it -0.50*** -0.53*** -0.56*** 
REEXit-1 -0.06** -0.06 -0.04 
finopen1OECD_EZ1i 
 
-0.04   
finopen1*core 
 
0.3* 0.33* 0.30 
finopen1*periphery 
 
-0.27** -0.27** -0.28** 
EMU -1.76 
 
  
income per capita 0.49*** 
 
0.45*** 0.39*** 
Oil price -0.04*** 
 
-0.04*** -0.04*** 
Number of countries 21 14 12 
Observations 273 168 156 
ܴଶ 0.48 0.49 0.45 
 
Hausman test  5.58 27.01*** 104.9*** 
Wald test for interaction 
terms (F or  
14.91*** 
0.95 
28.00*** 
13.78*** 
25.48*** 
13.51*** 
*** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 5. CA determinants in the EU countries over time. Fixed effects model. 
 Full sample Economic  integration sample Post-EMU sample 
 (1986-2012) (1993-2012) (1999-2012) 
Constant         14.34*** 9.09** -0.82 
    
fisbalit *core 0.20** 0.3** 0.89*** 
 
fisbalit *periphery -0.15** -0.08 0.02 
 
bcy.it -0.30** -0.41*** -0.53*** 
 
REEXit-1 -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.06 
 
finopen1*core 0.07 0.02 0.33* 
 
finopen1*periphery -0.13** -0.16** -0.27** 
 
income per capita 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.45*** 
 
Oil price -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 
Number of countries 14 14 14 
Observations 317 272 196 
ܴଶ 0.31 0.44 0.49 
Hausman test  50.08*** 33.49*** 104.9*** 
Wald test for interaction 
terms (F or  
6.58* 
6.14* 
5.87** 
5.70** 
25.48*** 
13.51*** 
*** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. *With respect to Table 3 we dropped the EMU dummy to 
compare the coefficients’ magnitude over time. 
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Table 6. CA elasticity to main explanatory variables in the EU countries* 
  Full sample Economic integration sample Post-EMU sample 
  (1986-2012) (1993-2012) (1999-2012) 
bcy.it 
 -0.04 -0.05 -0.72 
REEXt-1 
 -25.3 -17.0 -13.8 
fisbalit *core 0.4 0.4 1.2 
fisbalit *periphery -0.4 0.2 -0.1 
finopeni1*core 0.3 0.1 1.8 
finopeni1*periphery -0.3 -0.4 -1.5 
* The grey area indicates that the elasticity is referred to not statistically significant coefficients. 
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Table 7. CA imbalances and “governance” in the EU countries. Sample 2000-2012. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3* Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant -14.86** -9.33** -3.55 -5.46* -4.81 -0.05 -2.11 
 
fiscalbalit *core 0.71*** 0.95*** 1.1*** 0.74*** 1.00*** 0.93*** 0.73*** 
 
fiscalbalit *periphery -0.14* -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.11* 
 
REEXit-1 0.07* 0.01 -0.10** -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08** 
 
bcycle.it -0.46*** -0.49*** -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.60*** -0.47*** -0.44*** 
 
finopeni1*core 0.17 0.14 0.40** 0.42* 0.02 0.12 0.36 
 
finopeni1*periphery -0.46*** 0.31** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.32** -0.25** -0.27** 
 
Income per capita 0.46*** 0.24** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.21** 0.28** 0.49*** 
 
Oil price -0.03** -0.02 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03* -0.04*** 
 
corruption 
 
1.72***       
gov. effectiveness**  3.52**  
 
    
capital mkt reg   0.40     
capital control    0.32    
voice and 
accountability** 
    4.71**   
reg. quality 
indicators** 
     -1.35  
priv. sect credit       0.23* 
Number of 
countries 
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Observations 168 154 168 168 131 154 168 
ܴଶ overall 0.61 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.42 0.22 0.56 
 
Wald test for 
interaction (a) 
32.94*** 
10.85*** 
38.5*** 
3.96* 
27.06*** 
11.22*** 
27.74*** 
13.00*** 
48.25*** 
5.05** 
32.4*** 
2.64 
38.17** 
11.85*** 
**Voice and accountability, government effectiveness and regulatory quality indicators are only available from 2002, Portugal 
is not included in the governance indicators. 
*** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. (a) The first row refers to financial openness, the second one 
to fiscal balance. 
